CURRICULUM VITAE

Contact Information	657 Frank Rhodes Hall Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 USA	<i>Voice:</i> 1-607-592-3489 <i>Fax:</i> 1-607-255-9860 <i>E-mail:</i> thanh@cs.cornell.edu <i>Web:</i> www.cam.cornell.edu/~thanh
Education	 PhD, Applied Mathematics, Cornell University, USA. (May 2010.) Thesis: Network Resource Allocation Games and Applications. Advisor: Professor Éva Tardos. 	
	 Diploma of Mathematics, Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary. (1999 – 2004.) Thesis: Disjoint Paths and Cuts in Planar Graphs. Advisor: Professor András Frank. 	
Professional Experience	 Research Intern at Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK, Summer 2009. Visiting Researcher at Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary, Fall 2007. PC member of Sigmetrics (shadow). Journal Reviewer for Operation Research Letters, Algorithmica. 	
Skills	Programming languages: C++, Python, Matlab.	
Awards	Scholarship of ACM SIGecom 2007.Scholarship of Hungarian Republic 1999-2004.	
Teaching Experience	• Instructor for <i>CS 482:</i> Introduction to Analysis of Algorithms.	
	• Teaching assistant for: CS 684: Algorithmic Game CS 485: Mathematical Four CS 482: Introduction to An CS 481: Introduction to Th	ndations for the Information Age, alysis of Algorithms,
Patents	Weighted proportional sharing mechanism, Microsoft Corporation (filed September 2009).	
Papers	• Worst-case Revenue Maximization in Single-Parameter Auctions In Preparation We introduce a revenue benchmark for Single-Parameter Auctions, and give a mechanism obtaining a constant factor of the benchmark.	
	• Revenue Upper Bound for Quasi-proportional Sharing Mechanism, (with M. Vojnović), In preparation.	

We show a revenue upper bound on prior-free quasi proportional sharing mechanisms, and give a mechanism that achieves a near optimal revenue.

- The Weighted Proportional Sharing Mechanism, (with M. Vojnović), Submitted. We study the traditional proportional sharing mechanism when providers act strategically, and show applications to sponsored search.
- Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local Lemma, (with É. Tardos), WINE 2009.
 We introduce a new technique to prove the existence and find approximate pure Nash equilibria in graphical games in polynomial time.
- Approximately Maximizing Efficiency and Revenue in Polyhedral Environments, (with É. Tardos), EC 2007.
 We generalize the bandwidth sharing game to a general polyhedral, and analyze the efficiency as well as revenue of a Nash equilibrium.
- Parallel Imaging Problem, (with É. Tardos), ESA 2008.
 We develop a new type of graph cut algorithms to reconstruct medical imagines obtained by MRI machines.
- A Simple LP Relaxation for the Asymmetric Traveling Salesman Problem, *APPROX-RANDOM*, 2008.

We introduce a new linear program relaxation for this classical problem. We show that our relaxation is as strong as the Held-Karp relaxation but it improves the number of non-zero coordinates of the extreme points.

- On the Disjoint Paths Problem, Operation Research Letters, Vol. 35, 1, 2007.
 We give a simple combinatorial algorithm for the Disjoint Paths Problem. This is the currently best known approximation algorithm for the problem.
- Subgraph Characterization of Red/Blue-split Graphs and Kőnig-Egerváry Graphs, (with E. Korach and B. Peis), SODA 2006. We characterize the class of graphs whose maximum matchings and minimum vertex covers are of the same size.

References

Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University, USA, kleinber@cs.cornell.edu.

Éva Tardos, Cornell University, USA, eva@cs.cornell.edu.